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1.  INTRODUCTION  
How  can  the  least  developed  countries  (LDCs)  deal  with  the  effects  of  global  climate  change,  to  which  
they  contributed  little  and  over  which  they  have  little  control?  With  many  analyses  now  concluding  that  
some  degree  of  climate  charge  is  all  but  inevitable,  attention  must  shift  increasingly  to  adaptation  
measures  but  in  this  task  the  LDCs  are  particularly  challenged.  The  adaptation  and  resilience  literature  
generally  agrees  that  adaptation  capabilities  are  a  function  of  both  the  intensity  of  the  impacts  of  
climate  change  on  the  community  and  the  resources  it  can  marshal  to  respond  to  them.  Resource  
constraints,  particularly  but  not  just  of  the  financial  kind,  are  therefore  the  major  limiting  factor  on  the  
LDCs’  response  to  climate  change.  What  makes  the  resource  constraints  even  more  pernicious  is  the  
widespread  belief  that  local  institutions  are  unprepared  to  even  absorb  large  financial  transfers  from  
overseas  and  so  potential  donors  are  reluctant  to  ramp  up  their  assistance  programs  or  to  channel  their  
funds  to  and  through  the  national  and  local  governments.  This  leaves  aid-‐receiving  countries  in  an  
institutional  vulnerability  Catch-‐22:  not  having  stronger  institutions  precludes  them  from  receiving  the  
very  funds  which  they  need  to  strengthen  their  governing  institutions.    
How  weak  are  institutional  capacities  and  in  which  ways  are  they  weak?  This  question  is  critical  in  
properly  addressing  rather  than  merely  proselytizing  about  institutional  needs.  Evaluating  the  
institutional  capacities  of  developing  countries  to  facilitate  adaptation  to  climate  change  requires  a  
critical  theoretically-‐informed  empirical  analysis  of  organizational  capabilities,  governance  structures  
and  the  political  economy  of  climate  change  adaptation  practices  and  potential.  In  this  paper,  we  
analyze  these  capacities  in  the  case  of  Nepal,  which  can  be  considered  in  many  ways  to  be  an  
archetypical  LDC  with  problems  associated  with  internal  socio-‐ethnic  cleavages,  weak  governments,  
political  conflict  and  uncertainty,  severe  organizational  constraints,  and  of  course,  widespread  poverty.  
In  this  conference  paper,  we  report  on  our  main  findings  related  to  analyzing  the  organizational  capacity  
of  government  structures  in  Nepal  for  dealing  with  issues  related  to  climate  change  adaptation.  Our  full  
research  program,  which  is  currently  ongoing,  investigates  broader  institutional  analysis  and  includes  
assessment  at  the  village  level.    
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2.  INVESTIGATING  INSTITUTIONAL  AND  ORGANIZATIONAL  CAPACITIES  
Methodology  
Our  focus  is  on  investigating  the  institutional  setting  because  it  sets  the  policy  context  in  which  
adaptation  decisions  are  or  are  not  taken.  Our  methodology  incorporates  a  content  analysis  of  several  of  
the  policy  documents  most  relevant  to  climate  change  adaptation  complemented  by  interviews  with  
various  critical  actors  in  the  corresponding    institutional  settings.  The  documents  we  selected  for  review  
were,  in  addition  to  the  National  Adaptation  Program  of  Action  (NAPA)  and  Local  Adaptation  Plan  of  
Action  (LAPA),  the  National  Biodiversity  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  and  the  Forest  Sector  Strategy.  As  part  
of  the  content  analysis,  we  first  listed  explicit  statements  regarding  (a)  climate  change  in  general  and,  
more  importantly  (b)  adaptation  to  climate  change.  We  then  enumerated  the  actions  and  instruments  
listed  in  the  policies.  At  the  third  stage,  we  discussed  the  organizational  capacities  and  institutional  
capacities  required  to  execute  them  and  realize  the  formal  written  policy  intent.  We  state  this  in  italics  
to  emphasize  that  for  the  national  and  local  level  actors,  their  intents  (preferences)  might  be  quite  
different  from  that  which  is  adopted  as  the  written  policies,  for  a  variety  of  factors  which  we  discuss  in  
the  section  on  the  political  economy  of  climate  policies  in  the  LDCs.    
In  our  research,  we  focus  on  three  action  arenas:  village  development,  agriculture  and  forestry.  The  
reason  for  this  is  that  adaptation  capacity  is  a  function  of  both  the  intensity  of  the  impacts  caused  by  
climate  change  and  the  resources  to  which  a  community  has  access  and  entitlement.  Local  development  
therefore  is  a  key  issue  in  increasing  adaptive  capacities,  and  in  this  area  the  relevant  government  
organizations  are  the  Village  Development  Committee  (VDC),  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  
Development  (MARD)  and  the  Ministry  of  Forests  and  Soil  Conservation  (MFSC).  In  each  of  these  
ministries  and  departments,  we  conducted  several  key  informant  interviews  at  all  levels  of  the  
organization,  from  the  head  offices  to  the  field  outposts.  We  also  conducted  long  open-‐ended  
interviews  in  the  villages.  
As  indicated  in  the  NAPA  and  LAPA,  several  other  ministries  and  departments  are  also  relevant  for  a  
more  complete  approach  to  climate  change  management  in  Nepal,  but  such  a  comprehensive  treatment  
is  to  some  extent  duplicative  and  to  some  extent  also  beyond  the  scope  of  our  research  program.    
The  Institutional  Approach  
North’s  classic  definition  that  institutions  are  the  rules  of  the  game  is  a  pithily  useful  statement  about  
the  concept.  Rules  in  turn  are  humanly  devised  constraints  on  behavior,  a  structure  of  incentives  (North  
1990),  and  shared  understandings  about  which    actions  are  required,  prohibited  and  permitted  (Ostrom  
2011)  and,  we    would  add,  condoned.  Rules  serve  many  purposes,  including  to  achieve  order  and  
predictability,  serve  as  cognitive  shortcuts  for  action,  and  also  to  justify  actions.  Rules  are  
complemented  by  norms,  and  while  compliance  is  often  voluntary,  rules  ultimately  need  to  be  enforced  
by  human  agents  (Ostrom  1980).  
At  the  outset,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  institutions  and  organizations,  terms  which  many  
people  use  interchangeably.  Some  (e.g.,  Egberg  2003:118)  claim  that  all  institutions  are  organizations,  
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but  this  is  confusing  and  unhelpful.  To  illustrate,  it  is  more  sensible  to  think  of  the  game  of  football  (with  
all  its  rules  and  norms)  as  an  institution,  and  the  individual  teams  as  organizations  (though  I  suppose  
that  some  diehard  fans  would  consider  their  own  team  to  be  an  institution  steeped  in  tradition  and  
culture).  Similarly,  the  Hindu  caste  system  is  an  institution  and  cannot  be  said  to  be  also  an  organization.  
The  dictionary  definition  of  organization  as  a  group  of  people  with  a  particular  purpose  helps  in  
clarifying  this  confusing  relationship:  organizations  are  grouped  around  interests,  and  institutions  are  
grouped  around  rules.    
If  we  keep  institutions  and  organizations  and  organizations  well-‐separated  conceptually,  then  it  
becomes  easier  to  understand  how  institutions  determine  outcomes  and  also  to  not  confuse  
institutional  and  organizational  strengthening  or  capacity  building.    
In  practice,  we  found  the  most  heavily  cited  framework  for  such  an  analysis—the  Institutional  Analysis  
and  Design  (IAD)  framework  developed  by  Ostrom  and  her  colleagues—to  be  useful  for  conceptualizing  
our  analysis  but  unwieldy  for  designing  and  organizing  our  field  research.  Ostrom  (2011:9)  herself  
admitted  that  key  components  of  the  IAD  framework  “confused  many  readers.”  The  IAD  presents  a  
seven-‐step  analytic  process  with  comprehensive  sets  of  questions,  but  designing  a  survey  instrument  
following  those  specific  sets  of  questions  is  awkward  and  our  own  review  of  papers  that  begin  with  the  
IAD  in  their  analytic  framework  found  that  rarely  did  the  actual  research  closely  follow  or  present  the  
findings  in  the  terms  prescribed  by  IAD.      
To  simplify  the  research  approach,  we  identified  six  dimensions  of  individual,  institutional  and  
organizational  attributes  that  permit  both  research  and  analytic  clarity  and  ease  of  organization  of  the  
research  process.  These  dimensions  are:  Knowledge,  Attitudes,  Processes  (or  Protocols),  Incentives,  
Resources,  and  Environment.  These  six  dimensions  are  neither  mutually  exclusive  nor  exhaustive,  but  
they  do  represent  the  most  important  components  of  institutional  and  organizational  capacity.  We  
should  also  stress  that  there  are  substantial  feedback  loops  among  these  categories.    
(a)  Knowledge  
Skills  are  based  on  knowledge,  which  consists  of  several  components  and  aspects.  Knowledge  relates  to  
the  ability  to  recognize  information  and  to  match  and  map  it  to  appropriate  categories  and  patterns.  
Skill  is  the  speed  and  accuracy  with  which  a  subject  can  solve  a  problem  by  rapidly  recognizing  the  
pattern  it  represents  and  then  deploying  the  appropriate  response.    
In  rational  choice  approaches,  game  theory  provides  most  of  the  underlying  theoretical  mechanics  upon  
which  institutional  analysis  is  constructed.  The  formal  mathematics  of  game  theory,  however,  can  only  
be  applied  to  highly  restricted  and  stylized  situations.  When  the  constraints  one  behavior  are  as  loose  as  
they  are  in  most  real-‐world  situations,  then  the  rules  structures  of  institutions  do  not  neatly  map  into  
unique  solutions.  The  outcomes  of  these  interactions  then  depend  to  a  great  extent  upon  the  skills  
which  different  actors  bring  to  the  action  arena.  This  element  of  skill  endowment  is  missing  in  most  
analyses  of  institutional  performance  which  instead  explicitly  assume  even  require,  that  for  equilibrium  
to  be  obtained,  each  player  must  employ  the  best  conceivable  strategy.  Here  rules  and  strategies  
become  indistinguishable  and  each  set  of  rules  is  assumed  to  map  directly  into  a  desired  outcome.  More  
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sophisticated  approaches,  however  clearly  distinguish  between  rules  and  strategies.  Rules  are  sets  of  
choices  and  actions  which  are  either  permitted  or  prohibited  whereas  strategies  are  the  mental  maps  
devised  by  actors  which  they  think  will  yield  the  best  result  for  them.  
How  institutions  and  organizations  perform,  and  what  outcomes  are  obtained,  depends  substantially  on  
the  level  and  type  of  knowledge  actors  are  endowed  with,  and  further,  changes  in  the  levels  of  
knowledge  has  the  potential  to  change  outcomes  even  without  changing  the  basic  framework  of  the  
institution.  
  (b)  Attitudes    
Attitudes  are  the  least  studied  and  least  understood  of  the  different  dimensions  which  affect  behavior,  
While  the  study  of  attitudes  held  early  promise  as  a  device  to  predict  and  explain  behavior,  it  gradually  
faded  from  the  scene  as  the  research  community  was  unable  to  come  to  agreement  on  basic  definitional  
issues  such  as  what  attitudes  are,  how  they  are  formed  and  how  they  influence  behavior  (Fishbein  &  
Ajzen  1975).  Nevertheless,  the  ascendancy  of  behavioral  economics  has  brought  attitude  back  into  the  
gamut  of  variables  relevant  to  understanding  human  and  organizational  behavior.  An  underlying  
assumption  of  institutional  analysis  is  that  actors  have  preferences  (which  in  the  rational  choice  
approach  are  exogenously  determined)  and  actors  seek  to  realize  there  preferences.  Kahneman  et.al.  
(200x),  after  performing  a  series  of  experiments  deconstructing  the  claims  of  contingent  valuation  and  
willingness-‐to-‐pay  studies,  concluded  that  people  have  attitudes  rather  than  preferences  especially  
when  it  comes  to  public  concerns.  While  the  dictionary  defines  attitude  broadly  as  “a  settled  way  of  
thinking  or  feeling  about  someone  or  something,  typically  one  that  is  reflected  in  a  person’s  behavior”,  
in  this  case  our  social  psychology  approach    attributes  to  it  an  emotional  quality  whereby  a  particular  
entity  or  object  evokes  a  degree  of  positive  or  negative  affection.    
Attitudes  can  affect  choice,  and  indeed  can  be  manipulated.  Kahneman  et.al.  (200x)  noted  that  because  
the  objects  of  attitudes  are  mental  representations  and  not  objective  state  of  affairs,  the  valuation  that  
a  person  gives  to  an  object  depends  on  how  the  object  is  presented  and  how  the  choice  around  it  is  
framed.  The  same  object,  they  explain,  if  it  is  presented  as  a  part  of  different  sets,  can  obtain  different  
valuations  which  derive  from  the  attitude  that  a  subject  has  towards  the  set.  They  claimed  that  
calculating  the  economic  value  of  environmental  species  or  services  is  futile  using  CV  or  WTP  
methodologies  because  the  monetary  value  attributed  to,  say,  a  coral  reef,  other  that  perhaps  derived  
from  its  ability  to  attract  tourist  dollars,  is  more  an  expression  of  the  strength  of  a  positive  feeling  
towards  a  species,  what  they  call  a  positive  affective  valuation,  than  an  actual  value  in  any  economic  
sense  of  the  term.  
Attitudes  also  govern  institutional  performance  by  affecting  how  subjects  operationalize  policy.  Just  as  
there  are  rules  in  use,  which  may  be  quite  different  from  the  rules  in  place,  policies  may  be  
implemented  quite  differently  from  how  they  are  stated  in  the  relevant  documents,  especially  at  the  
local  level  in  developing  countries.  So,  policy  practice  may  diverge  significantly  from  policy  intent,  or  
their  formal  written  content.  In  developing  countries,  because  policies  are  often  drafted  by  outsiders,  
their  intent  is  quite  different  from  and  incongruous  to  the  interests  of  those  who  must  implement  them.  
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Interpretation  of  the  policy,  and  the  strategic  gaming  around  it,  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  policy  process.  
Internal  policy  tensions  are  also  often  present,  such  as  in  forest  policies  between  trying  to  protect  forest  
cover  and  making  the  forest  yield  economic  benefits.  Because  of  this,  policies  have  the  scope  for  
discretion  in  implementation  and  attitude  determines  how  much  and  in  which  direction  discretion  will  
be  exercised.    
As  with  knowledge,  actor  preferences  and  attitudes  are  not  static.  
(c)  Processes  
The  systems  of  processes  and  protocols  in  an  organization  give  us  an  idea  about  general  capabilities.  
These  capabilities  are  not  necessarily  climate  change  specific,  but  as  they  are  important  to  
understanding  how  well  the  organizations  are  prepared  to  perform  their  core  tasks,  they  also  help  us  to  
understand  how  the  organization  will  approach  climate  change.  Within  this  set  of  issues  are  included  
leadership,  planning  structures,  and  communication  and  outreach  with  the  main  stakeholders.  
(d)  Incentives    
A  core  argument  about  studying  rules  and  norms  is  that  they  establish  the  framework  of  incentives  
which  guide  the  choice  and  behavior  of  actors,  and  thus  contribute  to  determining  institutional  
outcomes.  The  strength,  structure,  and  scaling  of  incentives  allow  for  behavior  to  be  modulated  in  ways  
which  can  contribute  to  achieving  broader  societal  goals.  While  the  general  approach  to  how  incentives  
work  is  a  focus  of  much  academic  or  practitioner  debate,  the  calibration  of  incentives  is  consistently  an  
issue  which  confounds  policymakers  and  administrators.  Weakly  calibrated  incentives  are  ineffectual,  
those  too  strong  are  wasteful.  
(e)  Resources    
Organizational  theorists  have  posited  that  the  level  of  conflict  in  an  organization  is  proportional  to  the  
resource  limitations  confronting  it.  This  is,  of  course,  intuitive  as  a  larger  number  of  interests  are  
competing  for  the  same  resources.  Even  though  resource-‐constrained  organizations  have  more  of  an  
incentive  to  innovate,  they  are  less  able  to  dedicate  resources  to  the  innovation  task.  Meanwhile,  
organizations  with  more  slack  resources—actual  or  potential  resources  in  excess  of  those  minimally  
required  for  execution  of  its  core  functions—are  able  to  invest  more  in  innovation  and  thus  adapt  
successfully  to  internal  pressures  for  adjustment  or  external  pressures  for  change,  as  well  as  to  initiate  
changes  in  strategy  with  respect  to  the  external  environment  (Borgueous  1981).  Slack  resources  
sometimes  also  take  the  form  of  “surge  resources”  which  prevents  a  tightly  wound  organization  from  
rupturing  in  the  face  of  a  surge  of  activity.    
In  addition  to  the  innovation  function,  resource  availability  also  affects  the  enforcement  function  of  
institutions.  A  fundamental  concern  of  institutional  analysis  is  the  enforceability  of  rules  and  how  this  
affects  the  predictability  of  actors’  decisions  and  strategies.  Rules  may  be  auto-‐enforcing  because  they  
are  structured  in  ways  that  actors  find  it  in  their  own  interest  to  follow  them,  but  often  they  have  to  be  
enforced  coercively,  in  which  case  resources  are  required  for  detection  and  enforcement  of  rules.  
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Lacking  enforcement  credibility  means  that  actors’  strategies  will  differ  commensurately  and  the  rules  in  
use  will  deviate,  often  substantially,  from  the  formal  written  rules.  The  predictability  of  formally  
established  rules  and  stability  get  reduced  if  resource  constraints  are  more  severe  because  the  payoffs  
for  cheating  become  higher  and  the  penalties  effectively  lower.    
Even  if  the  right  framework  of  rules  is  discovered,  establishing  institutions  is  an  expensive  proposition.  
Bringing  a  community  together  around  a  set  of  resources  management  rules  and  systems  requires  a  
gestational  expenditure.  Members  have  to  be  trained  in  recognizing  and  understanding  how  the  
rules/institutions  work,  they  must  learn  and  practice  exercising  their  roles,  their  participation  is  in  itself  
costly  to  them,  and  indeed,  if  the  marginal  benefits  derived  participation  in  the  institution  are  not  
adequate,  their  interest  will  flag.  Institutions  have  to  be  cost  effective,  which  is  another  way  of  saying  
that  overt  or  structural  institutional  isomorphism  is  unlikely  to  lead  to  functional  institutional  
isomorphism  in  the  presence  of  severe  resource  constraints.  
(f)  Environment  
The  institutional  environment  can  be  of  two  principal  types:  the  permissive  or  the  prohibitive.  In  
permissive  environments,  any  action  which  is  not  explicitly  prohibited  is  allowed  whereas  in  prohibitive  
environments  any  action  which  is  not  explicitly  authorized  is  disallowed.  Elster  (1989)  terms  these  as  
institutions  with  a  “principle  of  legality”  and  “positive  conception  of  the  law”  respectively.  This  approach  
sets  up  the  community  or  individual  and  the  state  in  dichotomous  and  opposing  groups  because  In  the  
former  (permissive)  condition,  action  by  the  state  must  be  explicitly  authorized  by  law  while  in  the  latter  
(prohibitive)  condition  the  state  is  barred  from  acting  in  a  particular  situation  only  if  a  law  exists  
specifically  prohibiting  it  from  doing  so.  It  can  be  easily  deduced  from  these  definitions  that  the  
permissive  environment  allows  for  greater  human  creativity  and  agency  while  the  prohibitive  
environment  more  tightly  circumscribes  action.  Because  human  agency  is  less  circumscribed,  actors  in  
permissive  institutional  environments  are  more  likely  to  pursue  what  March  &  Olsen  termed  “the  logic  
of  consequentiality”  by  which  actors  make  the  rational  choice  to  pursue  the  strategies  most  likely  to  
result  in  an  end  desired  by  them.  Others  have  described  this  as  an  environment  where  calculus  
dominates.    On  the  other  hand,  when  the  institutional  environment  is  prohibitive,  as  can  be  deduced  to  
be  the  case  in  more  traditional  societies,  March  &  Olsen  say  that  a  “logic  of  appropriateness”  operates.  
Here  culture  dominates  over  calculus  because  actors  are  expected  to  conform  more  to  norms  than  to  
act  in  their  interests.  The  degree  of  permissiveness,  or  at  least  the  perceptions  of  actors  of  
permissiveness,  will  thus  influence  the  range  of  acceptable  means  and  in  doing  so  the  creativity  of  the  
system.  
3.  CLIMATE  POLICIES  AND  PLANNING  IN  NEPAL  

  

Our  setting  is  Nepal,  a  Himalayan  country  sandwiched  between  Tibet  and  India  in  an  elongated  sloping  
rectangle  about  800  km  long  and  200  km  wide,  divided  roughly  evenly  between  the  high  mountains,  
middle  hills  and  the  plains  forests.  The  country  is  vulnerable  to  climate  change,  but  the  research  on  
potential  impacts  is  still  ongoing  and  the  interim  findings  have  not  yet  been  scaled  down  to  local  level  
impacts.  
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Politics  and  Administration  
The  country  has  been  politically  unstable  for  the  better  part  of  the  last  100  years  which  is  reflected  
partly  by  the  fact  that  in  this  period  the  country  has  had  eight  different  constitutions  or  national  
governing  arrangements.  A  two  decade  long  insurgent  campaign  by  Communist  guerillas  ended  in  2006  
with  a  new  Parliament  which  abolished  the  monarchy  in  2008.  The  Nepalese  Constituent  Assembly,  
which  is  the  country’s  current  Parliament,  greatly  expanded  in  its  current  version  to  601  members,  is  
dominated  by  three  political  parties:  The  Nepalese  Congress  (the  country’s  oldest  party  which  was  
established  in  1947  and  represents  the  middle  class  elites)  is  the  largest  party  with  196  seats.  Two  
Communist  parties,  the  moderate  Communist  Party  of  Nepal  (Unified  Marxist-‐Leninist)  has  175  seats  
while  the  more  militant  Unified  Communist  Party  of  Nepal  (Maoist)  which  led  the  insurgency  has  80  
seats.    
Administratively,  the  country  was  divided  into  5  developmental  zones  drawn  vertically  from  east  to  west  
but  the  Constitution  just  adopted  in  2015  has  now  divided  the  country  along  ethnic  and  geographic  lines  
into  6  provinces.  This  new  division  has  reignited  simmering  social  tensions  and  catalyzed  fresh  and  
sometimes  violent  clashes  between  the  Terai-‐inhabiting  madhesis  and  the  traditional  mountain  elites.  
The  entire  administrative  structure  consists  of  nine  levels,  with  the  elected  minister  and  state  minister  
at  the  top  followed  by  the  bureaucracy,  which  is  led  by  a  Secretary-‐level  appointment.  The  first  two  
bureaucratic  levels  (down  to  the  level  of  Joint  Secretary)  are  based  in  Kathmandu.  The  district  offices  are  
headed  by  an  Under  Secretary,  who  is  served  by  two  lower  levels  of  gazetted  (executive  or  managerial  
cadre  who  have  the  legal  authority  of  being  official  representatives  of  the  state)  officers  and  below  them  
two  levels  of  non-‐gazetted  officials.  At  the  lowest  rung  are  locally  appointed  peons,  such  as  the  Forest  
Guard  in  the  case  of  the  Ministry  of  Forests  and  Soil  Conservation.  
Planning  and  Policies  for  Climate  Change  Adaptation  in  Nepal  
Nepal’s  climate  change  policies  emerge  from  the  United  Nation’s  call  for  developing  countries  to  
prepare  National  Adaptation  Programs  of  Action  (NAPAs).  These  are  the  first  steps  in  organizing  efforts  
to  analyze  the  potential  impacts  of  climate  change  on  the  environment,  economy  and  communities  and  
to  then  develop  policy  responses  to  tackle  these  impacts.  The  next  steps  include  scaling  down  the  
NAPAs  to  the  local  level,  and  then  developing  context-‐specific  policies  and  actions,  preferably  with  levels  
of  detail  that  are  sufficient  for  local  administrators  to  develop  and  execute  timely  and  appropriate  
interventions.  Taken  together,  these  action  plans  intend  to  provide  a  comprehensive  approach,  a  road  
map,  to  tackling  climate  change.    
The  Nepalese  Ministry  of  Science  Technology  and  the  Environment  released  its  NAPA  in  2010  and  Local  
Adaptation  Plans  of  Action  (  LAPA)  Manual  in  2011.  These  documents  brought  together  various  
perspectives  on  climate  change  impacts  and  concluded  with  long  lists  of  actions  to  be  undertaken  in  the  
rather  short-‐term  to  prepare  the  country  adequately.  Nepal’s  NAPA  and  LAPA  have  been  well-‐received  
in  the  epistemic  community  that  has  grown  around  climate  change  issues  in  the  country,  with  the  
general  feeling  that  the  plans  are  participatory  and  generally  comprehensive.  But  are  they  
implementable?    
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We  analyzed  several  of  the  principal  policy  documents  which  are  relevant  to  Nepal’s  efforts  to  adapt  to  
climate  change.  One  of  these  is  the  new  Forest  Sector  Strategy  which  materially  influences  climate  
issues.  The  overall  goal  of  the  Strategy,  while  not  mentioning  climate  change,  clearly  emphasizes  the  
role  of  forests  in  generating  locally  inclusive  incomes,  thereby  shifting,  at  least  in  rhetoric,  the  emphasis  
from  a  conservation  orientation  to  a  development  approach.  The  adaptation  perspective  is  one  of  the  
five  clearly-‐identified  outcomes  of  the  Forest  Sector  Strategy  as  it  states  the  achievement  of  a  “climate  
resilient  society  and  forest  eco-‐system”.  There  is  an  entire  thematic  area  “responding  to  Climate  
change”  and  its  stated  objective  “to  strengthen  the  climate  resilience  of  people  communities,  forests,  
and  ecosystems  and  mitigate  global  climate  change  through  REDD+  approaches.”  The  possibility  of  using  
future  carbon  credits  under  an  expanded  REDD+  framework  serves  as  much  to  provide  incentives  for  
forest  protection  as  it  does  to  create  a  stream  of  income  for  the  country  and  for  forest  communities.  
This  adaptation  component  of  increasing  funding  is  more  relevant  and  interesting  for  the  policymakers  
than  the  mitigation  aspect  of  REDD  programs.    
Another  is  the  LAPA  framework  adopted  in  Nepal  places  the  responsibility  to  develop  adaptation  plans  
at  the  local  level  itself.  Local  government  does  not  figure  as  the  central  actor  in  this  process;  instead,  
civic  institutions  such  as  NGOs  and  Cooperatives  are  supposed  to  do  most  of  the  work  in  terms  of  
developing  capacity  and  projects  at  the  local  level  while  the  major  responsibility  attributed  to  local  and  
higher  level  administrative  structures  are  to  gather  community  priorities  and  integrate  them  into  various  
planning  processes  such  as  the  Sectoral  Plan  Formulation  Committee  and  the  Integrated  Plan  
Formulation  Committees.  At  the  national  level,  the  responsibilities  are  mainly  to  formulate  policy,  
develop  the  necessary  legal  framework,  capacity  development  and  monitor  projects.  The  NAPA  itself  
indicates  that  80  percent  of  climate  change  adaptation  funds  would  be  channeled  to  the  VDCs,  which  of  
course  means  a  large  influx  of  funds.  There  are,  of  course,  few  if  any  local  level  NGOs  that  can  take  on  
this  responsibility.    
The  Climate  Change  Policy  of  2011  contains  a  list  of  action  items  including  the  establishment  of  a  
Climate  Change  Center,  initiating  LAPAs,  preparation  of  a  national  strategy  for  carbon  trade,  formulation  
of  a  low-‐carbon  and  climate  resilient  economic  development  strategy,  and  the  development  of  a  reliable  
impact  forecasting  system.  A  Climate  Change  Council  responsible  for  managing  and  coordinating  various  
programs  at  the  political  level  was  also  mandated  and  one  of  its  main  tasks  is  to  approve  the  annual  
Climate  Change  Fund  expenditures.  All  of  these  had  initial  deadlines  between  2012  and  2013.  Most  have  
been  breached.  
The  National  Biodiversity  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  (2014-‐2024)  aims  mitigate  the  impacts  of  climate  
change  on  biodiversity  and  to  promote  the  resilience  of  ecosystems  and  human  communities.  Its  specific  
projects  include  developing  environmental  monitoring  programs,  guidelines  for  integrating  biodiversity  
concerns  in  climate  change  adaptation  projects,  promoting  environmentally-‐friendly  farming  systems  
such  as  organic  farming,  implementing  PES  and  REDD+  programs,  improving  connectivity  of  eco-‐systems  
by  building  north-‐south  corridors,  and  promoting  the  development  and  implementation  of  climate  
change  adaptation  plans  by  forest  user  groups.    
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But  when  we  turn  to  analyzing  the  institutional  and  organizational  arrangements  for  achieving  this  goal,  
we  find  several  areas  of  concern.  The  MFSC  is  identified  as  the  key  actor  and  its  role  is  to  enable-‐design  
policies  and  procedures,  provide  technical  services,  facilitate,  coordinate,  plan  and  budget.  If  we  are  to  
contrast  these  attributed  responsibilities  with  the  difficult  the  Ministry  currently  has  in  executing  just  its  
core  tasks,  it  becomes  quite  clear  that  this  is  more  an  aspirational  then  a  realistic  perspective  which  is  
being  proffered.  At  the  local  level  the  roles  and  responsibilities  are  also  clearly  delineated.  According  to  
the  Forest  Sector  Strategy  document,  the  local  government  administration  (District  Development  
Committee  and  Village  Development  Committee)  is  responsible  for  identifying  climate  services,  protect  
while  natural  resources  at  to  car  levels  and  contribute  to  livelihood  and  climate  change  adaptation.  The  
role  of  Civil  Society  Organizations  is  correctly  defined  as  one  of  advocacy,  but  then  subsequent  
sentences  leave  it  rather  open  to  interpretation.  Then  a  catch-‐all  term  “development  partners”  are  said  
to  be  responsible  for  support  for  almost  all  the  objectives  of  the  program:  sustainable  forest  
management,  environmental  conservation  and  change  adaptation,  addressing  the  threats  from  
environmental  degradation  and  climate  change  contributing  to  livelihood  and  climate  rest  of  the  people,  
promoting  innovation,  skills,  capacity  and  knowledge  systems,  and  sups  for  the  real  mad  up  (i.e.  
financing  of  practices.  Interestingly,  even  institutionalizing  the  process  is  a  responsibility  attributed  to  
these  partners).  Given  the  long  laundry  list  of  objectives  requirements,  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  
identify  even  the  level  of  orisons  required  let  alone  how  to  obtain  them.  Nor  does  the  Forest  Sector  
Strategy  address  specific  strategies  for  human  resource  development  and  management.  
Thus  we  see  that  large  scale  interventions  are  required  in  several  sectors,  the  most  important  including  
forests  and  agriculture  but  these  interventions  have  been  stated  without  considering  the  capacity  needs  
of  the  organizations  which  are  nominally  in  charge  of  implementing  them.  Indeed,  the  gap  between  the  
capacities  needed  to  implement  these  plans  and  what  Nepalese  institutions  are  currently  capable  of  
doing  has  not  been  systematically  analyzed.    
4.  FINDINGS  &  ANALYSIS  
We  now  present  the  findings  based  on  our  initial  set  of  interviews.  We  should  note  here  that  our  
research  program  is  a  few  months  behind  schedule  because  of  the  earthquake  that  occurred  earlier  this  
year  in  Nepal  and  the  because  of  the  current  unrest  in  the  country.  While  we  had  at  this  stage  hoped  to  
have  included  the  very  senior  as  well  as  more  community  voices  to  this  analysis,  at  the  present  time,  the  
research  presents  our  findings  from  mid  to  low  level  administrative  staff  and  about  a  third  of  the  rural  
community  respondents  we  aimed  to  survey.  
Knowledge  
Knowledge  about  climate  change  and  its  potential  impacts  is  high  among  all  the  respondents.  Mid  level  
and  junior  public  officials  from  all  three  branches  of  government  as  well  as  villagers  had  accurately  
conceptualized  the  effects  of  climate  change  and  could  list  its  impacts  in  terms  of  the  issues  most  
important  to  them.  Sometimes,  however,  they  conflated  climate  change  with  general  environmental  
problems.    
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Knowledge  about  climate  change  adaptation  was,  however,  quite  low.  When  asked  how  the  local  
community  could  prepare  and  deal  with  the  impacts  of  climate  change,  most  respondents  offered  
measures  which  would  actually  serve  to  mitigate  climate  change  rather  than  help  the  community  adapt.  
For  example,  some  advocated  using  less  and  cleaner  energy.  It  was  only  when  the  respondents  were  
prompted  with  specific  adaptation  activities—infrastructure  development,  outmigration—did  they  
indicate  agreement  and  understating.  So  far,  none  independently  have  offered  examples  of  what  could  
be  done  for  adapting  to  climate  change  at  the  local  level.  We  do  not  find  this  surprising  if  we  consider  
that  the  way  climate  change  is  packaged  and  represented  in  the  media,  even  in  developing  countries,  as  
a  problem  of  consumption.  In  this,  we  surmise,  the  local  media  is  copying  international  trends.  
Knowledge  about  development  strategies,  which  also  contributes  to  reducing  vulnerability,  was  similarly  
inadequate  and  one  could  say  to  some  extent  obsolete.  For  all  three  groups—forestry,  agriculture  and  
local  development—development  was  primarily  about  increasing  production  whereas  the  contemporary  
literature  on  local  economic  development,  especially  as  it  treats  value  chains,  is  more  about  access  to  
market  and  insertion  chains.  This  technical  preoccupation  with  supply  side  issues  rather  than  the  even  
more  demand  side  management  leaves  the  administration  fairly  unprepared  to  execute  its  
developmental  responsibility.    
Only  in  the  case  of  agriculture  did  the  respondents  point  specifically  to  agricultural  adaptation  measures  
such  as  changing  the  seeds  and  varieties  being  a  recommended  for  planting.  
Attitude  
In  our  research,  we  wanted  to  find  out  more  about  the  attitudes  administrators  had  about  climate  
change  preparedness,  adaptation  and  towards  working  with  the  community  in  general.  A  substantial  
literature  in  Nepal  and  the  region  claims  elite  as  well  as  administrative  bias,  and  some  researchers  have  
highlighted  cases  of  officials  being  reluctant  to  implement  policy  mandates  transferring  control  over  
resources  to  local  communities  (e.g.,  Iversen  et.al.  2006;  Springate-‐Baginski  2013).  In  our  field  level  
investigations  we  found  negative  attitudes  towards  community  control  and  management  to  be  muted  
and  nuanced.  In  most    cases,  forest  officials  recognized  that  community  management  helped  protect  the  
forest,  especially  given  that  the  department  was  constrained  in  patrolling  but  a  few  also  commented  
that  while  community  management  was  good  for  forest  protection,  the  forests  themselves  were  not  
being  managed  “scientifically”  and  that  opportunities  for  virtuous  commercial  and  economic  
exploitation  were  being  lost.  Other  responses  indicated  that  forest  officials  felt  that  illegal  logging  was  
shifting  from  community  managed  forests  to  state  forests,  and  in  one  case  the  official  even  said  that  
community  members  would  take  wood  from  the  state  forests  without  authorization  while  saving  their  
own  forests  for  a  later  date.  Nevertheless,  a  large  majority  of  the  respondents  viewed  community  
management  and  participation  as  a  positive.    
In  the  agricultural  sector,  the  attitudes  of  the  officials  and  the  farmers  were  mutually  predominantly  
negative.  Agricultural  officials  felt  that  farmers  need  to  show  more  initiative  and  that  they  would  
indiscriminately  take  anything  which  is  offered  for  free.  Farmers  meanwhile  indicated  severe  
dissatisfaction  with  the  services  provided  by  the  agriculture  department.    
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All  respondents  indicated  that  in  community  level  meetings,  the  poor,  the  Dalits  and  the  women  spoke  
and  intervened  less,  indicating  the  presence  of  deeper  cultural  attitudes.  
Processes  
We  expected  to  find  a  diffusion  of  the  typically  bureaucratic  frustratingly  slow  process-‐dominant  
approaches  in  our  research.  However,  the  comments  elicited  by  questions  about  paperwork  and  
permissions  indicated  that  the  bureaucracy  is  not  so  burdensome.  While  the  paperwork  required  is  
typical,  in  most  cases  staff  reported  that  they  could  quickly  get  verbal  or  written  permission  or  approval  
if  necessary  to  take  up  some  task.    
The  area  in  which  the  processes  were  weak  was  in  coordination  with  other  departments.  Most  
respondents  indicated  that  this  happened  rarely  and  only  at  higher  levels.    
Communication  was  also  weak.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  NAPA  was  adopted  in  2011,  and  that  the  
MCCICC  was  formed  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Ministry  of  Environment,  little  of  this  has  percolated  
down  to  the  local  level,  as  none  of  our  respondents  indicated  any  ongoing  program  to  address  climate  
change.    
Incentives  
As  we  expected,  there  were  few  incentives  to  better  performance  at  the  local  level.  However,  we  also  
noted  that  an  important  negative  incentive  was  the  frustration  that  field  level  staff  felt  about  not  being  
able  to  practice  their  skills,  such  as  in  scientific  forest  management.  In  terms  of  doing  something  
innovative  or  using  their  own  initiative,  almost  all  staff  reported  that  self  satisfaction  was  the  only  
motivating  force.  
Resources  
Rather  than  ask  respondents  directly  about  how  tight  the  resource  situation  was,  which  normally  would  
always  elicit  complaints  about  insufficiency,  we  asked  about  to  what  extent  they  were  able  to  fulfill  their  
designated  tasks  and  what  could  make  them  more  effective  in  their  tasks.  Without,  therefore,  being  
prompted  about  resource  sufficiency,  the  respondents  across  the  three  organizations  and  at  all  levels  
reported  severe  performance  constraints  due  to  inadequate  resources,  often  for  the  most  basic  tasks.  In  
the  forest  department,  for  example,  field  level  staff  said  that  they  (i)  lacked  the  instruments  to  do  the  
most  basic  of  surveys  of  the  areas  assigned  to  them,  (ii)  did  have  transport  to  do  patrolling  and  did  not  
receive  funds  to  travel  to  their  field  sites,  (iii)  could  not  do  reforestation  activities  for  lack  of  saplings.  
The  agriculture  department  staff  reported  that  they  did  not  receive  funding  sufficient  to  execute  
planned  programs  or  to  satisfy  community  demand  for  subsidies  and  training  projects  which  were  
already  announced.  The  local  development  office  did  not  directly  mention  a  funds  shortage,  but  after  
being  asked  about  their  budgets,  we  estimated  that  they  received  less  than  $5  per  capita.      
Relieving  the  funding  constraint  would  however  still  not  permit  the  administration  from  delivering  fully  
on  the  range  of  services  to  which  the  population  is  nominally  entitled.  When  we  asked  questions  about  
how  they  allocate  their  time  in  their  tasks,  we  found  that  the  actual  numbers  of  staff  assigned  are  too  
11  
  

few  for  them  to  perform  any  but  the  most  basic  administrative  functions.  In  the  forest  department,  
much  of  the  time  of  the  gazetted  staff  goes  into  preparing  policy-‐mandated  forest  management  plans  
for  their  jurisdiction.  In  fact,  even  the  community  forest  management  plans  have  often  to  be  prepared  
by  the  forest  department  staff.  The  irony  of  the  situation  is  that  the  staff  are  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  
the  quality  of  the  plan  and  not  of  its  execution.  In  fact,  there  are  almost  never  sufficient  resources  to  
implement  the  plan.  Nevertheless,  because  it  is  an  administrative  requirement,  the  preparation  of  the  
plans  takes  precedence  over  on-‐the-‐ground  activities.  In  the  case  of  the  agricultural  department,  the  
manpower  constraint  is  even  greater  as  training  activities  which  they  are  required  to  provide  farmers  
are  time  intensive.  In  the  case  of  local  development,  the  Village  Development  Secretary  is  the  only  
official  and  has  no  support.  As  such,  the  Secretary  performs  most  administrative  functions  like  
distributing  earmarked  funds  and  only  the  most  minimal  developmental  activities,  which  consist  
primarily  of  calling  periodic  VDC  meetings  in  which  the  sparse  funds  are  distributed.      
The  manpower  constraint  serves  to  reinforce  local  level  asymmetries  of  power,  access  and  entitlement.  
Because  resources  are  never  sufficient  to  fulfill  demand,  more  active  members  of  the  community  
receive  privileged  access,  even  if  that  is  not  the  intention  of  the  front-‐line  staff.  For  example,  the  
agricultural  staff  expects  that  the  farmers  should  come  to  them  and  express  strong  interest  in  training  
because  they  do  not  have  the  time  to  go  to  the  field  and  perform  social  marketing  functions.  The  
poorer,  less-‐educated  farmers  naturally  do  not  have  that  inclination.  
Finally,  resource  constraints  prevent  even  the  most  minimal  of  rules  enforcement.    
Environment  
We  find  that  the  institutional  environment  in  Nepal  is  mostly  permissive.  For  the  local  actors,  even  the  
nominally  prohibited  actions  are  tolerated  and  condoned.  For  example,  infraction  of  minor  incidents  of  
illegal  logging  or  grazing  of  animals  in  national  forests  is  not  normally  punished  in  the  prescribed  
manner.  Local  level  officials  describe  routine  intervention  by  local  politicians  to  free  the  offenders,  
which  actually  makes  perfect  sense  as  the  prescribed  punishment  of  prison  for  many  of  the  offenses  is  
unsuitable  and  inappropriate.  Resource  constraints  also  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  a  permissive  
environment  as  the  local  administration  often  does  not  have  the  funds  to  even  transport  the  offender  to  
the  court.    
In  permissive  institutional  environments,  the  state  is  prohibited  from  acting  outside  of  what  is  legally  
specified.  We  find  that  this  is  generally  the  case  in  administrative  systems  in  Nepal,  and  South  Asia  
generally.  Administrative  staff  often  complain,  in  fact,  that  though  a  policy  states  in  broad  terms  what  
should  be  achieved,  it  is  often  silent  on  what  should  the  exact  procedures  for  executing  the  policy.  As  a  
result,  staff  often  flounder  in  trying  to  achieve  policy  intent.    
However,  we  found  that  for  the  individual  staff  member,  taking  initiative  is  neither  prohibited  nor  
discouraged.  They  are  certainly  not  encouraged  to  do  so  and  nor  are  there  any  incentives  available  for  
success.  Most  of  our  respondents,  when  asked  about  taking  initiatives,  replied  that  only  self-‐satisfaction  
motivated  them.  None  said  that  it  was  discouraged  or  potentially  problematic.    
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5.  DISCUSSION    
The  institutional  requirement  is  fundamental  to  understanding  the  management  of  climate  change  
policies  in  Nepal.  The  NAPA  clustered  initiatives  and  projects  into  nine  groups,  including  agriculture  and  
food  security,  water,  renergy,  disaster  management,  forests  and  biodiversity,  public  healthy  and  urban  
settlements  and  infrastructures.  The  document  aspires  to  integrated  management  of  agriculture,  water,  
forests  and  biodiversity.  At  present,  however,  our  interviews  revealed  that  there  are  little  to  no  higher  
or  lower  level  integration  of  management.  To  the  contrary,  at  the  ground  level  different  departments,  
especially  those  related  to  infrastructure  and  forest  and  water  management  are  frequently  in  conflict  
over  plans  and  developments.  The  cost  of  the  various  programs  and  schemes  under  NAPA  are  rather  
conservatively  estimated  at  about  $400  million  over  5  years  (about  the  price  of  only  one  large  inter-‐
continental  jetliner),  which  works  out  to  only  $  80  million  annually.  But  even  this  amount  is  significantly  
out  reach  for  the  government  which  receives  a  little  over  $1  billion  annually  in  aid  (about  730  million  in  
grants  and  500  million  in  loans).  At  the  lowest  levels  of  the  administration,  the  budgets  are  barely  
sufficient  to  pay  salaries,  leaving  little  to  nothing  for  real  interventions.    
Given  the  lack  of  resources,  it  is  not  surprising  that  there  is  a  corresponding  lack  of  interest  at  the  higher  
levels  of  government.  While  several  organizations  have  been  created  at  the  national  level.  These  include  
a  multi-‐stakeholder  climate  change  Initiatives  Co-‐ordination  Committee  (MCCICC),  a  Climate  Change  
Council,  (the  main  political  body  to  coordinate  on  climate  change  initiatives,  composed  of  the  ministers  
of  all  the  relevant  ministries)  these  are  fairly  moribund  institutions.  For  example,  although  the  CCC  is  the  
apex  political  body  on  climate  change  issues,  its    main  page  was  last  updated  in  2012  and  still  only  
highlights  the  fact  that  the  Council  had  met  four  times  in  2010.    
In  terms  of  the  policy  cycle,  we  find  that  the  key  stages  of  policy  formulation  and  design  are  practically  
completely  outsourced  to  consultants  selected  and  paid  by  donors.  Implementation  is  partially  
outsourced,  to  a  very  inadequate  degree,  to  international  local  NGOs.  Moreover,  overall  policy  
monitoring  and  evaluation  are  rarely  given  much  attention  in  a  systemic  manner,  rather  the  focus  is  on  
the  discreet  project  and  the  focus  is  on  outputs  rather  than  outcomes.  
The  near-‐complete  dependence  of  the  Government  of  Nepal  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  almost  all  
reports  issued  by  it  are  prepared  by  consultants  paid  by  donors.  For  example,  a  2013  report  on  
community  forestry  issued  (and  copyrighted)  by  the  Ministry  of  Forests  and  Soil  Conservation  comes  
with  the  standard  disclaimer  that  the  views  expressed  are  those  of  the  consultants  and  not  those  of  
either  the  Ministry  or  of  the  donors.    
It  could  be  argued,  on  the  one  hand,  that  identifying  needed  policy  actions  brings  into  sharp  relief  the  
capacity  gap  with  exists  and  in  doing  so  provides  also  a  road  map  for  capacity  development.  However,  
on  the  other  hand,  it  could  also  be  argued  that  if  the  capacity  gap  is  too  large,  or  if  the  required  
resources  for  filling  this  gap  are  unlikely  to  be  forthcoming,  then  the  policy  is  in  danger  of  merely  
gathering  dust  and  worse  yet,  more  promising  and  realistic  policy  options  are  not  likely  to  be  developed  
or  implemented.    
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Capacities  are  of  two  kinds:  organizational  and  systemic.  They  are  also  relevant  to  different  phases.  
Unbalanced  capacities,  for  example,  by  pulling  in  outside  experts  at  one  stage  of  the  process  [policy  
formulation  and  evaluation]  while  relying  only  on  local  actors  and  funding  at  other  stages  
[implementation]  leads  to  unbalanced  policy  proposals  and  prognoses.  With  the  aid  industry  stuck  in  the  
mode  of  developing  institutions  first,  much  money  is  being  spent  on  studies  and  capacity  building  
training  exercise  while  the  recipient  governments  wait  for  more  hard  contributions.  Our  analysis  
indicates  that  the  kinds  of  soft  capacity  building  exercises  are  unlikely  to  solve  the  problem  of  
institutional  capacity.  Greater  skills  are  never  unwelcome,  but  given  the  current  manpower  and  
budgetary  constraints,  we  cannot  expect  these  enhanced  skills  will  ever  be  rolled  out.  Indeed,  current  
skill  levels  are  already  going  a  waste  and  leading  to  much  frustration  among  the  field  staff.  
Applying  these  considerations  to  our  case,  we  make  the  following  observations:  What  is  the  potential  
for  Nepal  to  increase  the  economic  value  of  its  rural  production  structures  and  to  distribute  these  in  
more  equitable  ways  that  would  enhance  the  resilience  of  local  communities?  The  answers  are  complex  
and  require  the  national  administrative  structures  to  engage  intellectually  with  the  challenges.  This  
engagement  is,  unfortunately,  does  not  appear  likely.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS  
Our  conclusions  are  not  comforting.  We  have  identified  several  and  critical  problems  with  climate  
change  management,  not  just  in  the  governance  structures  of  the  country  but  also  in  those  of  the  global  
actors  that  are  investing  heavily  in  addressing  climate  change.  However,  institutional  rules  are  not  
immutable  and  in  any  case  actors  often  have  wide  scope  to  interpret  the  formal  written  rules.  Their  
actions  and  chosen  strategies  can  be  modified  by  changing  the  calculus  of  the  situation  through  targeted  
interventions.  Each  of  the  six  parameters  we  researched  in  this  paper  is  a  potential  point  of  intervention.  
The  most  significant  finding  from  evaluation  of  existing  institutional  capacities  indicates  that  there  
should  to  be  some  sort  of  balance  in  attention  paid  to  intervention  in  the  various  parameters.  For  
example,  investing  too  much  in  the  knowledge  parameter  while  not  addressing  material  resource  
constraints,  or  changing  protocols  without  changing  incentive  structures,  will  not  deliver  the  changes  
desired  in  performance  and  outcomes.  Outside  intervenors  should  be  conscious  that  they  themselves  
unhelpfully  gravitate  towards  certain  kinds  of  interventions  because  of  their  own  priorities  and  
limitations,  and  that  severely  unbalanced  capacity  building  interventions  can  be  counterproductive  and  
frustrate  shared  objectives.  Our  surveys  indeed  demonstrate  that  knowledge  development  has  been  
over-‐emphasized  with  respect  to  resource  availability,  protocols  over  incentives,  and  attitudes  ignored  
altogether.  Since  the  crisis  of  government  legitimacy  which  currently  plagues  LDCs  cannot  be  
sidestepped  by  relying  on  other  actors  to  deliver  essential  services  or  to  prepare  communities  to  face  
the  challenge  of  climate  change,  an  agenda  for  more  fruitful  engagement  with  local  government  and  
administrative  structures  requires  prioritization.  
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